This discussion of Eagle's board of directors is an updated excerpt from a larger report: Eagle's Albatross: An Analysis of Eagle Hospitality Properties and Its "Strategic" Alliances with Corporex and Commonwealth Hotels. Download a copy of the free report here.

Does Eagle Have A Majority Independent Board As Required by the NYSE?:

The presence of conflicts-of-interest tied to Mr. Butler make the board's independent directors crucial as objective advocates for the interests of outside shareholders. As the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Corporate Governance Rules note:

Effective boards of directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest.

Independent directors are important for the proper governance of every public company but they are uniquely important in Eagle's case because of the strategic alliance with Commonwealth Hotels, which dictates that Commonwealth has the right of first refusal to operate a new hotel "unless a majority of our independent directors decides in good faith for valid business reasons to use another management company."48 Lack of strong independence on Eagle's board could give Commonwealth a virtual monopoly on hotel operations, even when this would be contrary to the interests of Eagle's shareholders.

The NYSE, which requires the majority of directors on the board of a NYSE-traded company to be independent, defines an independent director as "someone whose only nontrivial professional, familial or financial connection to the corporation, its chairman, CEO or any other executive officer is his or her directorship. Stated most simply, an independent director is a person whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation."49

Eagle's own Corporate Governance Guidelines are more stringent than the NYSE. They state that "at least 75% of the Company's Board should be comprised of independent, non-employee directors with no significant financial or personal ties to the Company."50

It is questionable whether Eagle is in full compliance of the NYSE rules, and its own guidelines. In its 2006 proxy statement, Eagle claims that 6 of its 9 directors - Messrs. Costello, Engel, Fisher, George, Kohlhepp and McDowell - are independent under NYSE rules.51 Even if this assertion were true, Eagle is in violation of its own guidelines which call for a 75% independent board majority. However, it appears that 4 of the 6 directors classified as independent by Eagle have ties to the company or Mr. Butler that call their independence into question:

Director Classified as Independent? Potential Conflicts-of-Interest Held by Directors
Thomas E. Costello
Yes
Director of Corporex and holder of Eagle Operating Partnership Units
Thomas R. Engel
Yes
Consultant to Eagle and Corporex
Louis D. George
Yes
Director of law firm retained in 1997 by Key Property Development, a company then headed by Mr. Butler
Robert J. Kohlhepp
Yes
Several philanthropic ties to Mr. Butler
Paul S. Fisher
Yes
None found
Frank C. McDowell
Yes
None found
Thomas E. Banta
No
Corporex Executive Vice President, Corporex designee to Eagle board
William P. Butler
No
Eagle Chairman, Corporex Chairman & CEO, Chairman and 85% owner of Commonwealth Hotels
J. William Blackham
No
Eagle President & CEO and former Corporex Executive Vice President

Thomas Engel (Member of the Audit Committee):

Thomas E. Costello (Member of the Compensation & Governance Committee):

Robert J. Kohlhepp (Chair of the Governance & Compensation Commitee):

Louis D. George (Member of the Audit Committee):

It is crucial that Eagle's board possess a strong majority of truly independent directors that can protect shareholders from the conflicts-of-interest that exist between Eagle and Mr. Butler, Corporex and Commonwealth Hotels. At this point, it does not appear to us that Eagle has such a board.